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The Impact Of The Military On The Physical Quality 
Of Life In Latin American Nations 
MICHAEL G. FULLINGTON 
Arkansas State University 
The purpose of this paper is to assess the impact of influe ntial 
militaries on the physical quality of life in Latin American nations. While a 
considerable number of researchers have examined the relationship between 
military influence and the socio-economic development of Third World 
states, few have attempted to determine the ramifications of that influe nce 
on the effected citizens' lives.' 
The nations to our south deserve focused analysis because "the re are 
fundamental differences in the natural history of militarism in South 
America. The forms of military intervention represent more than a cent ury 
of struggle and accommodation which has produced politjcal institut ions 
different from those found in the new nations. " 2 
The Literature 
Lucian Pye suggested that militaries are some of the most, if not the 
most, technologically advanced oganizations in the Third World. 3 Others 
have argued that the military's awareness of technological developme nts 
places it in a position to lead modernization of Third World natio ns.' 
Johnson points out that in addition to the military's cognizance of 
technology, "social economic background , social status, and professi onal 
experience have combined to give officers, as a group, characteristics that 
influence their thinking when they intrude in civilian politics. "l Furt her-
more, Johnson contends that the soldiers' middle class backgrounds pro-
duce politicos sympathetic to the needs of the working class. Social and 
economic programs designed to redistribute the wealth in class stratifie d na• 
tions are, therefore, enhanced when middle class soldiers control the 
political institutions. 6 
In addition to the military's middle class values and its pursuit of 
technological advancements, the armed forces possess the ability to coerce 
and remain cohesive in periods of turmoil. This, some argue, prov ides 
soldier -politicians the necessary political control to pursue developme ntal 
policies.' 
On the other side of the question, a number of studies have concl uded 
that politically influential militaries will lobby for federal funds for military 
technological advancement, often at the expense of social programs. 8 The 
military will, some suggest, deliberately sabotage attempts at social refo rlll 
in an effort to minimize the development of competing forces. Arturo 
Valenzuela suggests that the military overthrow of Chile's Allende was due 
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. large part to the interference of civilian groups in the internal affairs of 
1
~e military and the threat that the military was losing much of its political 
~nf1uence. 9 The 1963 coup in Honduras, led by Colonel Castillo Armas 
1 ight be another example of a threatened military attempting to protect its 
:If-interest. ' 0 Victor Villanueva concluded that every government of Peru 
that has attempted to reduce the military budget has been overthrown.'' 
Others do not accept the notion that the military deliberately pursues 
olicies detrimental to social change. Instead, they claim that the military is 
~ot prepared to lead national politics. 12 According to Jae Souh Sahn: 
... meager education, internal cleavages, separateness from civilian 
society, and lack of appropriate political skills are factors that limit the 
capacity of the [armed forces] ... to provide effective political leader-
ship for a country striving for economic development ... 13 
Samuel Huntington concluded that there may not be as much conflict 
between the arguments noted above as one might expect. He suggested that 
in some situations militaries do advance social change, but in others they act 
as a regressive, or at least a conservative, force. Huntington observed that: 
... as society changes, so does the role of the military ... the more 
backward a society is, the more progressive the role of the military; the 
more advanced a society becomes, the more conservative and reac-
tionary becomes the role of the military ... In the former case, the 
military ... promote social and economic reform, national integration, 
and in some measure, the extension of political participation ... If, 
however, a society moves into a phase of mass participation ... the 
military becomes engaged in a conservative effort to protect the ex-
isting system against the incursion of the lower classes. 1• 
Huntington's proposition has been subject to empirical analyses in re-
cent years. The preponderance of the evidence available today suggests that 
the military has virtually no impact on social change in developing nations 
irrespective of the nation's level of development." The result has been a 
general rejection of Huntington's hypothesis. 
The approaches used in most analyses of Huntington's hypothesis have 
not examined the influence of the military. Instead they have developed 
either a dichotomy between military and non-military regimes, 16 or 
measured the number of months the military held the reins of political 
power. 11 Both of these approaches assume that the military is either in or 
out of power. The military may be an important influence in civilian 
regimes, and civilian interest groups may be important influences in military 
regimes. Even though the military virtually dominated every formal 
political institution at one time or another during the 1960s in Argentina, 
Brazil, Ecuador and Peru, the influence of the civilian technocrats was 
never eliminated. 18 Few would argue that the Mexican military has not had 
influence with Presidents Diaz, Echeverria or Portillo. The important point 
of this discussion is that the either/ or approach, while convenient for 
analytical purposes, probabiy is not an appropriate model of reality.' 9 
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Implicit in Huntington's works, but ignored by most analysts, is the 
idea that the educated middle class (white collar and professionals) are more 
likely than any other group to pressure the political institutions for reform, 
irrespective of who controls those institutions. 20 Adelman and Morr is 
recognized the importance of this group but were never able to adequate ly 
measure its political influence. 2 1 
The political influence possessed by the eduated middle class may have 
a significant impact on the military's ability to pursue policies of reform or 
stabilization. On the one hand, the educated middle class may assist the 
military in their efforts for reform in lesser developed nations. On the othe r, 
the middle class may obstruct the military's ability to stall social change . 
To summarize the literature-the impact that the military has on social 
change in Latin American nations is a bit of an enigma to analysts at th is 
time. Some researchers have concluded that the military has a positive im-
pact on social change while others have concluded that the effect is either 
negative or non-existent. Huntington suggested that all of these interp re-
tations are correct, depending upon the level of development of the natio n 
examined. According to Huntington, militaries in lesser developed natio ns 
will enhance social change while militaries in the more developed states will 
undermine that change. Secondly, Huntington and others suggest that the 
influence of the middle class, particularly as that influence is assimilitate d 
into the values of the soldier politicians, will have an impact on the relatio n-
ship between the military and social change. 
This paper will examine the relationship between the political influenc e 
of the military and the change in the physical quality of life in Lat in 
American nations. We will also attempt to determine if the influence of the 
middle class has any bearing on that relationship. 
Methodology 
To determine the change in the physical quality of life in 20 Lat in 
American nations between 1960 and 1970 the Physical Quality of Life Index 
(PQLI) developed by the Overseas Development Council (ODC) in 1977 is 
used. 22 The PQLI, which measures the degree to which a nation is meeti ng 
the minimum human needs of its people, has been widely used since its 
inception. 23 
We have long recognized the deficiency of income and GNP as 
measures of development. 2• The standard of living is often better in nati ons 
with lower income and GNP than other nations seemingly more 
economically sound. 25 The PQLI is not a measurement of developme nt, 
though, it is a measurement of how well that development has actually ad-
dressed the needs of the people. This index measures "three appare ntly 
universal concerns;" infant mortality rates, literacy rates, and life expectancy.2' 
The originators of the index argue that it: 1) does "not assume that ther e is 
42 
nlY one pattern of development; 2) ... avoid[s] standards that reflect the 
~alues of specific societies; 3) ... measure[s] results, not inputs; 4) ... 
reflect[s] the distribution of social results; 5) ... is easy to construct and 
comprehend; and 6) ... lend[s] itself to international comparison. " 21 
The founders of the PQLI surveyed over 100 indicators of development 
and / or welfare and concluded that "only three-infant mortality, life ex-
pectancy, and basic literacy-meet the [six] criteria set out above." 28 The 
index is an unweighted summation of the three elements transformed to 
result in a Oto 100 scale. Since the ODC's survey of PQLls is incomplete for 
many nations examined in this analysis, the author was forced to collect the 
necessary raw data and compute the index through the various formulas 
pecified by the ODC. 29 
The Physical Quality of Life Index does not consider such things as 
political and religious freedom, freedom from persecution, or freedom of 
mobility. Instead, it focuses on how well a government is meeting the "basic 
needs for food, sanitation, medical care, education, and all other necessities 
that determine life expectancy, infant mortality and literacy." 30 The 
founders of the index make no pretense that it measures the overall quality 
of life for inhabitants of specific nations, only the physical "distribution of 
ervices that contribute to basic human requirements for life. " 31 
Once the PQLls for 1960 and 1970 were determined for each country, a 
cheme to measure the change during the decade was necessary. The 
implest procedure would have been to subtract each nation's PQLI for 
1960 from the PQLI for 1970. But, it was feared that this would give biased 
results. As an example the PQLI for the Dominican Republic in 1960 was 
59, and increased to 68 in 1970, a 9 point improvement. In Venezuela the 
PQLI increased from 70 to 79 during the same period. Obviously, 
Venezuela's improvment was the same, in terms of points gained, as the 
Dominican Republic's. But, we would expect it to become more difficult to 
increase the PQLI as a nation moves closer to 100. A nation with a 99 percent 
literacy rate in 1960 would have more difficulty improving that rate 1 point 
by 1970 than would a nation with a literacy rate of 49 percent. Therefore, 
the following formula was designed by this author to adjust for the absolute 
level of the PQLI while still taking into account the observed change: 
(PQLI - PQLI ) x PQLI 
PQLia = c b b 
100 
Where PQLia is the measurement of how much the PQLI improved from 
1960 to 1970; PQLib is the PQLI for 1960; and PQLic is the PQLI for 1970. 
Multiplying the difference by the absolute value in 1960 means that a nation 
with a higher starting point will receive more credit for a similar change 
than a nation with a lower starting point. Back to our example-adjusted 
improvement in th PQLI of the Dominican Republic is: 
PQLia = (68 = 59) X 59 5.31; 
100 
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whereas the ame mea ure for Venezuela is: 
PQLla = (79 - 70) X 70 
100 
= 6.30. 
In this manner both change and the absolute level of PQLI are conside red. 
The advantage of the PQLI over individual measurements of the three 
components of th PQLI i that each culture or ociety may stre s diffe rent 
programs to improve the quality of life of their residents. The PQLI allows 
for the e cultural difference . 
James Torres' ratings of interest group power in Latin American coun. 
trie is used to determine the political influence of both the military and the 
educated middle cla s. Profes or Torre sent questionnarie to "po litica) 
scientists recognized as specialists in Latin American affairs. " '2 Fro m the 
responses to his urvey, plus a measurement of the size of the vario us in. 
terest groups, Torres developed a rating of the political power of nume rous 
intere t group , including the educated middle class and the milita ry, in 
each Latin American nation. Torres computed the tandard deviati on for 
the ratings of each group's influence in individual Latin American nations 
and found a high level of agreement among his respondents. n 
Zero order correlation coefficients will be calculated betwee n the 
Phy ical Quality of Life Index and the influence of the military . The 
advantage of thi coefficient over the more commonly u ed regressio n coef. 
ficient is that the results of zero-order correlation indicate the direc tion of 
the relationship. 34 Since we want to know if the military is po itive ly or 
negatively affecting the physical quality of life in Latin America, this coefti. 
cient wa con idered most appropriate for our data. 
The political influence of the educated middle class and the eco nomic 
development of each nation will act as control variables. The nation will be 
categorized into one of two groups depending upon whether they are in the 
pre-industrial revolution or industrial revolution stage of developme nt.'' 
The relationship between the PQLI and military influence will be compared 
within and between each group. 
A second method of control will be used to eliminate the influe nce of 
the educated middle class on the PQLI within each category of economic 
development. This method, partial correlation, also shows direction and is 
useful when the number of cases is too mall for categorical con trol ." 
Though we are dealing with a population and not a sample, we will ar• 
bitrarily set the level at which we reject the null hypothe is at '.05'. 37 
Analysis 
The data in Appendix I indicate that the physical quality of life improved 
in all 20 Latin American nations between 1960 and 1970. But, as would be 
expected, the degree of improvement varied significantly. Colum bia im· 
proved the most while Uruguay and El Salvador improved the least. The in· 
fluence of the military in each of the nations of Latin America during the 10 
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ear period from 1960 to 1970 was not found to be associated with the 
~egree of improvement in the Physical Quality of Life Index. The product 
rnornent correlation coefficient between PQLI and military influence is 
, _ .0951' which is not significant at the '.05' level (See Table 1). Much of 
the recent literature would lead us to expect this result. 
Huntington suggested that it is not enough to look at all nations-that 
the military will affect social change differently depending upon the level of 
development of the nations in question. When we categorize the Latin 
Arnerican nations as either in the pre-industrial stage of development or the 
industrial revolution stage of development our results change somewhat. 31 
The data in Columns 2 and 3 of Table l indicate that when this division is 
rnade, the impact of the military on the PQLI in the more industrial nations 
of Latin America is still relatively minor ( - .148). But, the impact in the 
pre-industrial nations is increased to a positive '.421 '. Though neither of 
these statistics is statistically significant, the results are interesting. These 
re ults suggest that in pre-industrial revolution Latin American nations, the 
rnore influential the military, the more improvement we will find in the 
pQLI. The correlation for industrial revolution nations is too weak to make 
any judgements about. Huntington indicated that the militaries in the pre-
industrial nations will "promote social and economic reform" to a greater 
extent than in the more industrialized nations. So, we might conclude that 
our findings support Huntington, though the correlations found may have 
occurred by chance. 
The influence of the educated middle class appears to have an impact 
on the relationship between the military and the change in the PQLI. The 
data in Table 2 display a surprising result. When the interfering effects of 
the educated middle class are removed, the impact of the military on politics 
i highly related to the physical- quality of life in both the more industrial 
and pre-industrial nations. The resulting coefficients of ' - .888' for in-
dustrial revolution nations and '+ .642' for pre-industrial revolution na-
tions are both significant at the .05 level of significance. This result suggests 
that once the political influence of the educated middle class is removed, the 
military is a fairly conservative force in the industrial revolution nations. It 
appears, on the other hand, to be a progressive force in the pre-industrial 
revolution nation . This finding, unlike the results of most recent research, 
upports Huntington's thesis that the military is a conservative force in the 
more industrial nations of Latin America, as long as it doe not have to con-
tend with a politically potent middle class. 
Most recent research has not found the influence of the military to be 
an adequate predictor of a system's performance. Our findings suggest that 
both the military and the middle class have an important influence on the 
improvement in the physical quality of life in Latin America. It might be in-
teresting to note how accurately we can predict a change in the physical 
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quality of life knowing the influence of both the military and middle class. 
Using the least squares regression approach we find that knowing the in. 
fluence of both the military and the middle class we can predict the level of 
improvement in the PQLI with a high degree of accuracy . 39 In fact, know. 
ing the political influence of the military and middle class in either the in. 
dustrial revolution or pre-industrial revolution nations in Latin America 
we can account for 81 percent of the variance in the PQLI (See Tab le 3).' 
Conclusion 
Unlike most recent studies which have concluded that the militar y has 
little effect on the system's performance, this analysis has provided infor. 
mation to suggest that the military has at least a potential for that infl uence, 
if the efforts aren't subverted by the middle class. We found a curvill inear 
relationship between military influence and improvement in the physical 
quality of life in Latin America when the effects of the middle class are 
removed (See Charts I & 2). If our assumptions of casuality have any validity, 
in the pre-industrial states the military is a positive force, but in the in-
dustrial revolution states, the military becomes a more conservative force. 
This finding supports Huntington's thesis. 
Our measure of change, PQLI, is a desirable indicator of the system's 
success in meeting the needs of the citizens, but there are many more factors 
that should be examined . In future research, indicators of economic and 
political change, as well as social, political and religious freedom shou ld be 
examined closely in order to determine what impact the military has on the 
overall quality of life in Latin America. 
TABLE I 
Zero Order Correlation Coefficients Between Military Influence and PQLI 
Influence of 
The Military 
PQLI 
All Nations 
r = - .095 
*(n/ a) 
PQLI-Industrial 
Revolution Nations 
r = - .148 
(n / a) 
PQLI-Pre-Indus trial 
Revolution Nati ons 
r = + .421 
(n / a) 
*figures in parentheses represent the level of significance for each correla-
tion coefficient ('n / a' = above .05). 
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TABLE 2 
part ial Correlation Coefficients Between Military Influence and PQLI 
Controlling for Influence of Educated Middle Class 
Influence of 
The Military 
PQLI-Industrial 
Revolution Nations 
r = -. 888 
*( .005) 
PQLI-Pre-lndustrial 
Revolution Nations 
r = + .642 
(.05) 
•figures in parentheses repre sent the level of significance for each correla-
tion coefficient. 
TABLE 3 
Ordinary Least Squares Regression Coefficients Between PQLI 
and the Influence of the Military and Middle Class 
PQLI-Industrial PQLI-Pre-Industrial 
Revolution Nations Revolution Nations 
Influence of r2 = .022 r2 = .177 
Military *(n/ a) (n/ a) 
Influence of r2 = .102 r2 = .683 
Middle Class (n / a) (.01) 
Influence of 
Militar y and r2 = .810 r2 = .813 
Middle Class (.01) (.01) 
*figures in parentheses represent the level of significance for each correla -
tion coefficient ('n / a ' = above .05) 
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CHART I 
Pictorial Representation of Relationship Between Strength of Military and 
Improvement in PQLI with Effects of Military Removed-Pre-Industrial 
Revolution Nations 
Change in PQLI 
CHART 2 
Pictorial Representation of Relationship Between Strength of Military and 
Improvement in PQLI with Effects of Military Removed-Industrial 
Revolution Nations 
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NATION 
Argentina 
Bolivia 
Brazil 
Chile 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Cuba 
Dominican Republic 
Ecuador 
El Salvador 
Guatemala 
Haiti 
Honduras 
Mexico 
icaragua 
Panama 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
APPENDIX I 
STAGE OF 
DEVELOPMENT* 
2 
I 
2 
2 
2 
I 
2 
I 
2 
I 
2 
2 
2 
CHANGE IN 
PQ LI I 960- 70 
2.5 
4.3 
3.1 
6.8 
7.9 
5.4 
7.2 
5.3 
4.2 
3.4 
3.6 
2.2 
5.2 
4.6 
5.2 
6.4 
7.8 
3.6 
1.7 
6.3 
• 1 = pre-industrial revolution; 2 = industrial revolution 
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